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I. INTRODUCTION
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover1 the United States
Supreme Court granted unprecedented access to U.S. courts for
persons seeking to file suit against a sovereign state. In particu-
lar, the Court held that the commercial activity exception under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)2 permit-
ted the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Republic of Ar-
gentina for refusing to repay its bonds. In a broader sense, the
Court's interpretation of the FSIA may spur additional litigation
by significantly restricting when sovereign states can assert a
defense of sovereign immunity.
Under the Court's interpretation of the FSIA and the com-
mercial activity exception, a sovereign state cannot assert sover-
eign immunity when it acts as a market participant, and its
actions directly affect the United States. A foreign government
can only assert sovereign immunity when it engages in acts pe-
culiar to sovereigns, such as the regulation of capital markets.
Implicit in Republic of Argentina is the conclusion that if a sov-
ereign state participates in private capital markets, its actions
are not peculiar to sovereigns, and thus it cannot claim sover-
eign immunity.
First, this article identifies the issues presented in Republic
of Argentina. Second, this article examines the historical devel-
opment and definition of the foreign sovereign immunity doc-
trine. Third, this article discusses the disparate approaches of
the circuit courts in defining the commercial activity exception
1. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). See also The Ma-
thias Bill, § 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (proposed amendment to FSIA).
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prior to Republic of Argentina. It explains why the Second Cir-
cuit came closest to Congress' intentions, in light of the legisla-
tive history of the FSIA. Fourth, this article contends that in
Republic of Argentina the Court failed to clearly and satisfacto-
rily define "commercial activity" in a manner certain to resolve
the circuit conflict. As a result, what constitutes "commercial
activity" is still in a state of evolution. This article concludes
that the failure to more clearly define "commercial activity" will
cause more sovereign states to be brought before American
courts, particularly developing sovereign states, because of their
greater need to intervene in their domestic economies.
A. REPuBLIC OF ARGENTNA V. WELTOVER, IN.: THE
CONTROVERSY.
In the early 1980's, the Republic of Argentina initiated a
Foreign Exchange Insurance Contract (FEIC) program 3 to stabi-
lize its volatile currency by purchasing American dollars and ex-
changing them at a fixed rate for Argentine currency. 4 The
FEIC's goal was to allow Argentine businesses to repay trouble-
some foreign debt with "hard currency," while permitting the
government to exercise some control over the process. 5
By 1982, Argentina did not have sufficient American dol-
lars to retire all its contracts under the FEIC, and it therefore
proceeded to refinance the remaining debt by issuing "Regis-
tered Bonds Denominated In United States Dollars" (Bonods)
and promissory notes. 6 Both the bonds and notes came due in
1986 and 1987. 7 The refinancing enabled foreign creditors to
3. "The FEIC program was intended to protect private Argentine debtors
from currency devaluations by allowing those debtors to purchase dollars at the
then-current exchange rate for future payment of foreign debts." See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Republic of
Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (No. 91 - 763). "Under this program,
the debtor paid a fixed amount of local currency to Banco Central in advance of
the maturity date of the foreign debt. Banco Central agreed, in turn, to provide
the dollars necessary to repay the foreign debt when it matured." Id.
4. See Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. 607 (the Argentine currency was then
the austral and had formerly been the peso). See also Matthew Patrick Mc-
Guire, Direct Effect Jurisdiction in the 90's: Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argen-
tina and a Broad Interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Comm. REG. 383 (1992). The Argentinean govern-
ment was in the wake of economic and financial turmoil stemming from a deval-
uation of its currency when the FEIC program was introduced. Id.
5. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (S.D.N.Y.),
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either keep their original debt with the Bonods as a guarantee,
or accept the Bonods and promissory notes in satisfaction of
their debt. Argentina was to repay the Bonods in American dol-
lars at the prevailing London Interbank market rate for 180-day
Eurodollar deposits.8 In addition, foreign creditors could choose
either New York, London, Frankfurt, or Zurich as the place of
repayment. 9
When some of the debt came due in May 1986, Argentina
still had insufficient American dollars to meet all of its obliga-
tions to its foreign creditors. 10 Through a Presidential decree
and an order from the Ministry of Economics, Argentina urged
its creditors to allow it to defer the payments due under the Bo-
nods." Weltover was one of several companies that insisted
that Argentina honor the repayment contract and that repay-
ment in New York proceed immediately. 12 When Argentina re-
fused to pay, Weltover filed suit against Argentina in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.' 3
In defense, Argentina asserted sovereign immunity and moved
to dismiss the suit based upon: (i) lack of in personam jurisdic-
tion; and (ii) forum non conveniens. 14 At trial, the District Court
denied both motions and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.' 5 Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.16 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court affirmed the
lower courts and denied Argentina's assertion of the sovereign
immunity defense, concluding that the District Court properly
exercised in personam jurisdiction over Argentina. '7
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Weltover, Inc., 753 F. Supp. at 1204.
11. Id.
12. In addition to Weltover, Springdale Enterprises, Inc. and Bank Can-
trade A.G. were also plaintiffs. See Republic ofArg., 504 U.S. at 607. For brev-
ity, "Weltover" will be used to refer to all the plaintiffs.
13. Weltover, Inc., 753 F. Supp. at 1201.
14. Id. But see Joseph D. Pizzurro, Sovereign Immunity - Commercial Ac-
tivity of Foreign State Having Direct Effect in the United States - Forum Non
Conveniens, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 560 (1991) (criticizing the Republic of Argentina
decision for failing to preserve the "presumption of separateness," established
by the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio
Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983), between the government of Argentina
and Banco Central).
15. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd 504
U.S. 607 (1992).
16. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607.
17. Id.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 8
Initially, the United States adhered to the absolute sover-
eign immunity doctrine under which sovereign states were al-
ways immune from the jurisdiction of American courts. 19 This
classical theory of sovereign immunity was first articulated in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,20 where the Supreme
Court refused to permit certain American citizens to bring suit
to reclaim a ship that agents of Napoleon's government com-
mandeered from them.21 The fundamental rationales for grant-
ing sovereign immunity included the concept that an equal has
no dominion over an equal22 and comity, as the Court later ac-
knowledged. 23  The doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity
was also applied to activities of sovereign states when they en-
18. See Stephen J. Leacock, The Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of
State Doctrine Revisited: Evolution of a Concept, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
1, 8-16 (1988).
19. See, e.g., Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). The Republic
of Peru:
followed the accepted course of procedure... [and] by appropriate rep-
resentations, sought recognition by the State Department of [the]
claim of immunity, and asked that the Department advise the Attor-
ney General of the claim of immunity and that the Attorney General
instruct the United States Attorney... to file in the district court the
appropriate suggestion of immunity of the vessel from suit. These ne-
gotiations resulted in formal recognition by the State Department of
the claim of immunity.
Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
Here the State Department... has allowed the claim of immunity and
caused its action to be certified to the district court through appropri-
ate channels. The certification and the request that the vessel be de-
clared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive
determination by the political arm of Government that continued re-
tention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign
relations.
Id. at 589 (emphasis added). See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig.,
461 U.S. 480 (1983). "[I]nitial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign
immunity fell primarily upon the Executive acting through the State Depart-
ment, and the courts abided by "suggestions of immunity" from the State De-
partment." Id. at 487.
20. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
21. Id. at 117.
22. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d
300, 302 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). See Steven H.
Thomas, Two Faces of the Trader: Guidelines for Distinguishing Between Gov-
ernment and Commercial Acts Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 23 TE:x. Irr'L L.J. 465, 466 n.1 (1988).
23. See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486.
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gaged in commercial activities.24 For example, in Exparte Peru,
the Court permitted a state to successfully assert a sovereign
immunity defense even though the claim was based upon a com-
mercial transaction. 25 The Court reached this conclusion de-
spite its earlier dictum in The Schooner Exchange indicating
that a "prince by acquiring private property in a foreign country
... may be considered ... [to be] laying down the prince and
assuming the character of a private individual."26
In 1952, the United States, through the State Department,
changed its foreign policy to embrace the narrower doctrine of
"restrictive" sovereign immunity.27 In this regard, "[a]ccording
to the newer [sic] or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sov-
ereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with re-
spect to private acts (jure gestionis)."28 Furthermore, the State
Department urged courts to adhere to the doctrine of restrictive
sovereign immunity, which the majority of European courts al-
ready followed. 29 The State Department necessarily acknowl-
edged that "a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the
courts" but noted that "courts are less likely to allow a plea of
sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do
so."3o Thereafter, the State Department participated in suits in-
24. Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 569-70 (1962) (noting
Italy's sovereign immunity from a suit involving a government owned vessel
which failed to deliver cargo accepted in Italy for carriage to New York).
25. 318 U.S. 578, 580 (1943). A Cuban corporation brought suit in district
court against a ship for failure to carry a cargo of sugar from a Peruvian port to
New York. Id. at 578. It had agreed to carry the cargo under the terms of a
contract made between the Cuban corporation and a Peruvian corporation that
owned the ship and acted as an agent of the Peruvian Government. Id.
26. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145
(1812) (emphasis added).
27. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976).
28. Id. See also, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488
(1983) (noting FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immu-
nity, which distinguishes between a foreign sovereign's public and private acts);
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1522 (9th Cir.) (holding under restrictive
principle of sovereign immunity embodied in FSIA, foreign State is subject to
suit only for private, not public, activities), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989);
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 394 (D.C. Del. 1978) (hold-
ing a foreign state, or an instrumentality thereof, is not absolutely immune
from suit under restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, rather, immunity is
restricted to suits involving sovereign or public acts).
29. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, supra note 27.
30. Id. But see Renana B. Abrams, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Inconsistencies in Application of the Commercial Activity Direct Effect Excep-
[Vol. 5:81
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volving sovereign states in American courts as amicus curiae in
an attempt to clarify when courts should recognize a sovereign
state's immunity.31 Amicus arguments often persuaded the
courts, 32 although one distinguished commentator cautioned
that: "in the absence of legislation or of pronouncement by the
Supreme Court,... [restrictive sovereign immunity] cannot...
be said to be conclusive upon the courts of this country."33 De-
spite this caution, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Vic-
tory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, relying in part upon a
State Department letter rejecting defendant Spain's assertion of
absolute sovereign immunity.3 4 Finally, in 1973, the State De-
partment persuaded Congress to codify the doctrine of restric-
tive sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976.3 5
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
A. PURPOSE
In enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
Congress sought to codify the doctrine of restrictive sovereign
tion, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 211, 230 (1991) (noting that the commercial activity
exception was originally applied broadly by circuit courts as a means of circum-
venting the unrestrictive approach).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606-08.
32. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 302, 303-04
(1986). See TROLAND S. LINK, FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, EXPROPRIATION,
ACTS OF STATE AND CoMITY (1991) (identifying this behavior by the courts as
the development of a "separation of powers" theory, temporarily resulting in
deference to Executive Branch determinations as to whether a foreign sover-
eign should be amenable to legal process in the United States).
33. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States- A Proposal for
Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 909 (1969). See also Carl
Marks & Co. v. U.S.S.R., 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding no retroactive
application of FSIA to cover foreign sovereign debt issue which took place before
both the Tate letter and promulgation of FSIA); Jackson v. P.R.C., 794 F.2d
1490, 1491 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding no retroactive application of FSIA).
34. 336 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1964) (denying sovereign immunity which
compelled Spain to arbitrate regarding charter of a vessel to carry wheat). See
also Alan E. Lipkind, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and Juris-
diction Under the Commercial Activities Exception: Vencedora Oceanica Nave-
gacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 4 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 125, 126 (1986) (pointing out that even after the appearance of the Tate
Letter, courts applied the Second Circuit's test in the absence of a clear State
Department directive). But c.f Republic of Mex. v. Hoffiman, 324 U.S. 30, 35
(1945) (stating in dicta that courts should not deny immunity allowed by the
U.S. government). See Lowenfeld, supra note 33, at 905-09.
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1601-11 (1982).
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immunity and to reduce the profile of the State Department in
sovereign immunity litigation.3 6 The purpose of the proposed
legislation, as amended, "[was] to provide when and how parties
can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in
the courts of the United States and to provide when a foreign
state is entitled to sovereign immunity."37 The FSIA was in-
tended to, inter alia, ensure application of the doctrine of restric-
tive sovereign immunity in litigation before American courts
and establish standards for proper service and in personam ju-
risdiction over foreign states.3 8 Congress, while recognizing the
sovereign immunity of foreign states, intended to restrict such
immunity when foreign states engaged in commercial activity.39
Moreover, consistent with the constitutional separation of pow-
ers doctrine, Congress envisaged a reduction in the impact of the
executive, through the State Department, in determining the
sovereign immunity of states, noting that:
[A] principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sov-
ereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch,
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determi-
nations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due
process. 4
0
Thus, enactment of the FSIA simultaneously codified the doc-
trine of restrictive sovereign immunity and perhaps more impor-
tantly, reserved its interpretation to the judiciary.
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. at 6605-06.
37. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604. See also, JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN Gov-
ERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (BNA) (1988) (comprehensive single vol-
ume treatise on the FSIA and cases litigated thereunder from the Act's passage
in 1976 to the end of 1987).
38. See H.R. Rep. No 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605-06.
39. Id. at 6606-08. See also LAsSA OPPENHEIM, 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 355-63 (9th ed. 1992); Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and Their Property, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 37-39,
U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991); GAMAL MouRsI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTI-
CAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW (1984); U. N. LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY at 55, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/20, U.N. Sales No. E/F.81.V.10 (1982).
40. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606. The U.S. Congress codified this purpose within the FSIA
as follows: "The Congress finds that the determination by the United States
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both
foreign states and litigants in United States courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
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B. APPLICATION OF THE FSIA's COMMERCIAL AcTvWTY
EXCEPTION BEFORE AND AFTER REPUBLIC OF
ARGENTINvA V. WELTOVER
Under the FSIA, a court can only assert jurisdiction over a
sovereign state when that state's actions come under an enu-
merated exception to the FSIA.4 ' Engaging in commercial activ-
ity is one of the enumerated exceptions,4 2 therefore, if a foreign
state engages in commercial activity4 3 it cannot assert sovereign
immunity.4 4 The FSIA commercial activity exception provides
that:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
4 5
From the face of the statute, this exception imposes two require-
ments: (1) that the sovereign engage in a commercial activity;
and (2) that the commercial activity must cause a direct effect in
the United States.46 From the legislative history, it is clear that
Congress intended a third requirement of minimum contacts to
ensure that jurisdiction is constitutional. 47 This minimum con-
tact prong includes both subject matter and in personam
jurisdiction.
First, Congress expanded the federal courts' exclusive sub-
ject matter jurisdiction through the FSIA, even though estab-
lished practice had allowed a person,48 in certain circumstances,
41. "These exceptions include cases involving the waiver of immunity,
§ 1605(a)(1), commercial activities occurring in the United States or causing a
direct effect in this country, § 1605(a)(2), property expropriated in violation of
international law, § 1605(a)(3), real estate, inherited, or gift property located in
the United States, § 1605(a)(4), non-commercial torts occurring in the United
States, § 1605(a)(5), and maritime liens, § 1605(b)." 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
42. Id.




47. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. Congress had already conferred original jurisdiction upon Dis-
trict Courts without regard to the amount in controversy for non-jury suits
against foreign states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982).
48. Congress did not limit the use of the FSIA to bring suit against a for-
eign state to only United States citizens. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
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to sue a foreign government in either state49 or federal court.50
Second, Congress intended that a court maintain in personam
jurisdiction over a sovereign state only if exercising jurisdiction
comported with traditional notions of due process. 51 In this re-
gard, Congress found that International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton52 and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 53 suggested
Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489-90 (1983). See also Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sov-
ereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REv. 385, 389 (1982).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982). With regard to any foreign state defendant
that does not wish to submit to state court jurisdiction, Congress has granted a
concomitant unqualified right to such foreign state to remove any such suit to
Federal court upon a showing, as the sole criterion for removal, of its status as a
sovereign state under the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1982). See H.R. Rep. No.
1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631.
50. Congress did this in several ways. First, it abrogated the classical doc-
trine of "absolute" sovereign immunity, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ber-
rizi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), reaffirmed some twelve
years later by the Supreme Court in Compania Espanola de Navegacion Mari-
tima, S.A. v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938) and substituted the "restrictive" prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity. Second, Congress included any political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a foreign State under the auspices of
the FSIA (such as a corporation, association, foundation, wholly or majority
State-owned company, etc.). See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982). Finally, Congress ex-
cluded private corporations incorporated under the laws of any of the fifty indi-
vidual states or a third country, regardless of that corporation's equity
ownership by a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982). See H.R. Rep. No. 1487,
supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613-14. See also Lisa
D. Goekjian, Jurisdiction Over Iran Under The FSIA And The Algiers Accord, A
Loose Application: Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1311, 1315 (1991) (pointing out that the necessary "attribu-
tion" for the acts of an instrumentality to be imputed to the sovereign is the
assertion of an agency relationship while Congressional intent in the FSIA was
to preserve the presumption of separateness); General Electric Capital Corp. v.
Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1380 (8th Cir. 1993) (determination of foreign corpo-
ration's status as a foreign state for purposes of FSIA must be made at the time
of the acts complained of, not at time suit is brought); First National City Bank
v. Banco Para El Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (pre-
sumption of separateness was intended to be overcome only where "a corporate
entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal
and agent is created" or where recognizing the separateness of the agency or
instrumentality "would work fraud or injustice"). But cf Gobay v. Mostazafan
Found. of Iran, No. 92-C6954, 1993 WL 432131 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1993)
(control which must be shown to overcome presumption of separateness be-
tween foreign sovereign and its instrumentality is stronger than mere princi-
pal/agent relationship).
51. Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991), relying
upon Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300,
313 (2d Cir. 1981) (FSIA may not confer personal jurisdiction where the United
States Constitution forbids it). See Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum
Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REv. 729
(1988) (detailed and thorough discussion of minimum contacts.)
52. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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that "the requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and
adequate notice [be] embodied in the provision."54 Under the
FSIA, Congress intended that substantive sovereign immunity
law, in personam jurisdiction and Due Process minimum con-
tacts analysis be determined coextensively and interdepen-
dently.55 In sum, a plaintiff needs to establish that a sovereign
state56 has "descended" from its "Olympian heights" to the pe-
destrian status of "market participant" by engaging in commer-
cial activity in the United States. 57
1. Commercial Activity58
Congress expressly codified the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity by reserving protection only for public (i.e. non-
commercial) acts of a sovereign state (jure imperii) and not for
their private (i.e. commercial) acts (jure gestionis).59 In order to
fully overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity under
53. 355 U.s. 220, 223 (1957).
54. Id. Accord Lipkind, supra note 35, at 127 (pointing out that U.S.C.
§ 1330(b) is patterned after the long-arm statute of the District of Columbia).
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6612 (noting Congress intended § 1330(b) of the FSIA to provide in effect a
Federal long-arm statute over foreign states).
55. See, e.g. Lipkind, supra note 34 (asserting that the FSIA's "intertwin-
ing of concepts of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and immunity that
United States law otherwise keeps separate has led to difficulty in judicial in-
terpretation and application of the FSIA"); Hadwin A. Card, III, Interpreting
the Direct Effects Clause of the FSIA's Commercial Activity Exception, 59 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 91, 92 (1990) (noting direct effect analysis, meant to address sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, and minimum contacts analysis, meant to deal with
personal jurisdiction, should have been kept distinct to achieve the aims of the
FSIA ).
56. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. at 6614-16; Transamerican S.S. v. Somali Democratic Republic,
767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion,
S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 199 (5th
Cir. 1984).
57. In modern times, "the real change has been the enormous growth, par-
ticularly in recent years, of 'ordinary merchandising' activity by governments."
Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 700 n.14 (1975).
See also Schmitthoff & Woolridge, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sover-
eign Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 2 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 199, 203-11 (1972). See also Timberg, Sovereign Immunity,
State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 109, 111 (1961).
58. For a discussion of the historical development of the commercial
activity exception, see Leacock, supra note 18, at 13-16.
59. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 39, at 355-63 (noting that the United King-
dom, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Egypt, Switzerland, Germany, France, Nether-
lands, Canada, Australia and Pakistan all recognize the jure imperii/jure
gestionis distinction).
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this analysis, a court must first be persuaded that the state's
acts are commercial in nature.
Prior to Republic of Argentina, there were no consistent
standards by which courts classified activities as either public or
private because, under the FSIA, Congress defined commercial
activity very broadly. Commercial activity under the FSIA is a
"regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commer-
cial transaction or act."60 More specifically, Congress indicated
that "the commercial character of an activity shall be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or par-
ticular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose."61 As Congress explained, "it has seemed unwise to
attempt an excessively precise definition of this term [commer-
cial activity], even if that were practicable."62 Though Congress
indicated that a "foreign government's sale of a service or prod-
uct, leasing of property, its borrowing of money,.. . or its invest-
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31,
at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614-16 (establishing criteria for com-
mercial behavior: 1) activities customarily carried on for profit; 2) conduct in
which a private person might engage; and 3) contracts); Ministry of Supply,
Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1983) (defining com-
mercial activity broadly to include actions committed outside U.S. territory if
those actions were "an integral part of the state's regular course of commercial
conduct" or if they had "substantial contact with the United States").
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). See also Abrams,
supra note 30, at 220 (noting that while the FSIA's legislative history supports
the use of the nature test, many courts have applied the purpose test to effec-
tively narrow the scope of the commercial activity exception). See, e.g., City of
Englewood v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 773 F.2d 31 (3rd Cir.
1985) (holding that purchase of property by head of mission for personal use is
not commercial activity, denying jurisdiction over sovereign); Yessenin-Volpin
v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see
Charles D. Day, L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela: Unnec-
essarily Permitting Foreign Plaintiffs to Sue Foreign Governments Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 17 BROOK J. INT'L L. 165, 179 (1991) (rely-
ing on a case decided in 1927, Metropolitan Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmer's
State Bank, 20 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1927), the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York used the purpose test of the FSIA to hold that the
nationalization of a bank, traditionally an undeniably sovereign prerogative,
which resulted in financial loss to a consortium of U.S. banks, was a commercial
activity with direct effects in the United States).
62. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
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ment of securities" are private acts,63 the essential inquiry looks
at the intrinsic nature of the sovereign state's activities. 6
4
Subsequently, in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the
Court declared that by performing an act which may just as
readily be performed by a private citizen, a sovereign state can-
not assert the defense of sovereign immunity.65 The Court
based its rationale on the Second Circuit's private person test.66
Until the Court adopted this approach, the circuits were split,
each applying the first prong of the FSIA's commercial activity
exception differently.
a. The Different Approaches of the Circuit Courts
The different approaches the circuit courts utilized prior to
Republic of Argentina lacked consistency and led to unpredict-
able outcomes. This was the inevitable result of Congress' broad
definition of commercial activity. Of all the circuit courts, the
Second Circuit, in Texas Trading & Milling Corp.,67 enunciated
perhaps the most rational and convincing test for interpreting
the commercial activity exception under the FSIA.68 In Texas
63. Id. (emphasis added). See Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co.,
No. 92-4177, 1993 WL 21327 at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993) (holding a com-
pany's ownership interest to be a commercial activity). See also, JOHN R. STE-
VENSON ET AL., UNITED STATES LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1983) (presenting a general analysis
of the FSIA, including comparisons with sovereign immunity laws of other
countries, and concluding that financial transactions by foreign sovereigns,
their agencies or instrumentalities are construed by the Act, as by the courts, as
commercial activity).
64. E.g., ontology rather than teleology. Cf De Sanchez v. Banco Central
de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1383, 1393 (1985). See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 617 (1992). "However difficult it may be in some cases to separate
"purposes" (i.e., the reason why the foreign state engages in the activity) from
"nature" (i.e., the outward form of the conduct that the foreign state performs or
agrees to perform) .... the [FSIA] unmistakably commands that to be done."
Id.
65. 504 U.S. at 614.
66. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d
300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (the Second Circuit
relied on the House Report to craft a rule whereby a foreign state's purchase of
goods would be considered aper se commercial activity). See also, H.R. Rep. No.
1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
67. 647 F.2d at 300.
68. Id. at 314-15. In addition to endorsing the private person test identified
below, the Second Circuit also delineated a comprehensive jurisdictional analy-
sis which lists five factors that must be present in order for a court to assert
jurisdiction under the FSIA consistent with due process principals. Id. These
include: 1) whether the activity qualifies as commercial (the private person
test); 2) whether the salient activities of the defendant bear the type of relation
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Trading, Nigeria had initiated an ambitious public works con-
struction program and had contracted to purchase more than
960,000 metric tons of cement.69 The government, however,
overestimated the tonnage of cement that it needed, and seri-
ously underestimated the quantity of cement that its contractors
could immediately ship under the contracts.70 Moreover, the ca-
pacity of its port facilities to cope with the arriving cement ship-
ments was, to put it charitably, completely inadequate.71
Finding itself unable to unload the cement from waiting ships,
Nigeria purported to repudiate both the supply contracts as well
as its letters of credit.72
The Second Circuit circumspectly approached the interpre-
tation of the FSIA, noting that because "no provision of the Act
.. define[d] 'commercial'," Congress must have "deliberately left
the meaning open ... ."73 After carefully analyzing the FSIA,
the Second Circuit reasoned that an activity is commercial "if
the activity is one in which a private person could engage."74
Applying the private person test, the Second Circuit concluded
that "Nigeria's activity here is in the nature of a private contract
for the purchase of goods. Its purpose, to build roads, army bar-
racks, whatever, is irrelevant."75 In contrast to the approaches
of other circuit courts, the Second Circuit's private person test
most accurately characterized the intent and logic of the FSIA
and most closely reflected its legislative history.7 6 The Second
Circuit has thereby developed the preeminent intellectual tool
for analyzing the FSIA's commercial activity exception.77
to the United States outlined in the FSIA; 3) whether the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction lies within the limits of "judicial power" set forth in Article
III of the U.S. Constitution; 4) whether personal jurisdiction is proper; and 5)
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the due process
clause. Id.
69. Id. at 303.
70. Id. at 305.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 308-09 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 309. See also, Leacock, supra note 18, at 15 n.93.
75. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 310 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 308-10 (extensively documenting the basis for this interpretation
by references to pertinent excerpts from the legislative history of the Act).
77. See generally Abrams, supra note 30 (pointing out that the Second Cir-
cuit's contribution to ending the confusion among the circuits was to abandon
the vagaries of the nature/purpose dichotomy and adopt the second part of the
House report's characterization of commercial activity. Thus, the opinion in
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. chose a known definition and applied that con-
cept with consistent results rather than inventing a de novo analysis).
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the pri-
vate person test in MOL Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangla-
desh.78 In MOL, the Ninth Circuit recognized Bangladesh's
sovereign immunity by declining to impose liability on Bangla-
desh for its refusal to honor a contract for the exportation of rhe-
sus monkeys.79 The contract required construction of a breeding
farm in Bangladesh to provide rhesus monkeys to be exported
for medical and scientific research.80 When India curtailed the
export of rhesus monkeys in 1977, the price of rhesus monkeys
on the open market rose significantly, whereas MOL was enti-
tled to continue paying the lower fixed price for its supply of rhe-
sus monkeys from the breeding farm in Bangladesh under the
terms of its contract.81 In 1979, Bangladesh alleged that MOL
had breached the contract term restricting use of the monkeys to
humanitarian research and terminated the contract.8 2 After
unsuccessfully seeking to arbitrate the dispute and to resolve
the matter through diplomatic channels, MOL filed suit against
Bangladesh for damages.83 Applying the private person test,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the contract "concerned [both]
Bangladesh's right to regulate imports and exports, a sovereign
prerogative... [and] Bangladesh's right to regulate its natural
resources, also a uniquely sovereign function."8 4 Moreover,
since both activities were uniquely sovereign and public in na-
ture, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that MOL did not successfully
rebut Bangladesh's presumption of sovereign immunity.8 5
In a later case, Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, the Second
Circuit continued to use the Texas Trading private person
test.86 In Shapiro, the Second Circuit denied Bolivia's assertion
of sovereign immunity with regard to its refusal to pay a promis-
sory note held by an American citizen living abroad.8 7 Bolivia
had issued forty promissory notes with a cumulative face value
of $81 million in order to purchase fifty-two Starfighter aircraft
78. 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
79. Id. at 1329.
80. Id. at 1327.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1328.
83. MOL Inc., 736 F.2d at 1328.
84. Id. at 1329. "A private party could not have made such an agreement."
Id.
85. Id.
86. Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991), relying
upon Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300,
308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
87. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1020.
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through its United States agent, International Promotions and
Ventures, Ltd. (IPVL).8 8  David Shapiro allegedly purchased
Note 12, which Bolivia had unsuccessfully attempted to recover
from IPVL in IPVL's bankruptcy proceeding. 9 In deciding Sha-
piro's suit against Bolivia for breach of contract, the Second Cir-
cuit categorized the pertinent activity giving rise to the claim as
simply the issuance of promissory notes to IPVL.9° Reasoning
from this substantive premise, the Second Circuit concluded
that "[it is self-evident that issuing public debt [securities] is a
commercial activity within the meaning of Section 1605(a)(2) [of
the FSIA]." 91 The court drew no distinction between the issu-
ance of public in contrast to private debt securities, presumably
viewing this as a distinction without a substantive difference in
this context. The court's focus on the nature of the transaction
was rationally consistent with the FSIA's intent and legislative
history in determining that the issuance of promissory notes
was commercial activity92 and that Bolivia was thus ineligible
for sovereign immunity protection. 93
Other circuits either did not adopt the private person test or
applied it unartfully. For example, in Practical Concepts, Inc. v.
Republic of Bolivia,94 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia denied Bolivia's assertion of sovereign immunity after
evaluating the substantive nature of a disputed contract for
services between Bolivia and Practical Concepts Inc. (PCI).95
Under the auspices of the Agency for International Development
(AID), Bolivia had received funding for a contract with PCI to
design and implement a program for rural development. 96
When AID withdrew funding, Bolivia terminated the agreement
with PCI in the same month. 97 In fact, the terms of the contract
entitled PCI to tax exempt status, preferential bureaucratic
treatment and diplomatic privileges. 98 In spite of these factors,
which only a sovereign state could offer, the Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court's grant of sovereign immunity to Bo-
88. Id. at 1014-15.
89. Id. at 1015.
90. Id. at 1018.
91. Id.
92. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N.
93. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
94. 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 1551.
96. Id. at 1545.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1549-50.
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livia.9 9 The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[i]t is more sensi-
ble, and faithful to the probable intent of Congress, we believe,
generally to center on the basic exchange (e.g., the sale of goods
and services), not on the facilitating features (e.g., expediting en-
trance of personnel and supplies), in determining whether an ob-
ligation qualifies as a 'commercial activity' for FSIA
purposes. "100 Essentially, in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
Bolivia's decision to enter into a garden variety service contract
with PCI was determinative, notwithstanding the fact that in
return PCI had received benefits which only a state could validly
grant.'0 1
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may well
have misconstrued the private person test by purporting to dis-
sect the case into "its subsidiary ... [and] its central prescrip-
tions" 0 2 rather than reaching a decision by evaluating the
contract as a whole. The Court of Appeals' approach reached a
decision based upon fragmentation of the contract, however ele-
gantly accomplished, rather than analyzing and evaluating it as
a coherent whole. In this regard, the decision of the District
Court is preferable because as the District Court reasoned, the
contract when taken as a whole was not one that a private party
could have made.10 3
99. Practical Concepts, Inc., 811 F.2d at 1552 (remanding the case to the
District Court to determine whether any of Bolivia's alternate pleas were meri-
torious). E.g. Bolivia alternatively pled that the district court should stay the
court proceedings and order resolution of the case by arbitration in accord with
the arbitration clause in the contract. Id. at 1545.
100. Id. at 1548. See Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160,
165-66 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating a service contract to promote Spanish wine in
the United States is a commercial activity sufficient to grant jurisdiction under
FSIA).
101. Practical Concepts, Inc., 811 F.2d at 1551. But see Abrams, supra note
30, at 215 (suggesting that the approach of the court in Practical Concepts was
actually superior to prior circuit court decisions because it applied the nature
test which focused on the activity upon which the suit was based (breach of
contract) without extending the analysis to query the nature of the counterpart
to the contract (a foreign state)).
102. Practical Concepts, Inc., 811 F.2d at 1550.
103. Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bol., 613 F.Supp. 863, 870
(D.D.C.), recons. denied, 615 F.Supp. 92 (D.D.C.1985). Use of the "tail-wag-
ging-dog" metaphor by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may be
particularly inept because the issue is not one of different parts of the anatomy
of a single creature, but rather the difference between two distinctly separate
creatures; e.g., the difference between a dog and an armadillo. Practical Con-
cepts, Inc., 811 F.2d at 1550.
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Subsequently, in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicara-
gua,104 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not adopt
the private person test in according the defendant, an agency of
Nicaragua, sovereign immunity with respect to its issuance of a
certificate of deposit. In 1978, Mrs. Najarro de Sanchez, a Nica-
raguan national, purchased a certificate of deposit worth
$150,000 from Banco Central, a privately-owned commercial
Nicaraguan Bank. In 1979, when General Somoza's regime was
on the verge of collapse, Mrs. de Sanchez decided to redeem her
certificate of deposit. 10 5 Citing foreign exchange controls, Banco
Central later declined to honor a check drawn on Nicaraguan
funds in the United States made available to Mrs. de Sanchez in
order to retire her certificate of deposit.10 6 The Fifth Circuit de-
cided that Banco Central's actions were sovereign because its
"actions in selling foreign exchange reserves were not the same
as those of a private bank ... [b]y law, [it] had overall responsi-
bility for the control and management of Nicaragua's monetary
reserves."10 7 The Fifth Circuit apparently based its conclusion
upon "the different purposes motivating the sales," indicating
that "the essence of an act is defined by its purpose." 08
Unfortunately, the De Sanchez court's analysis of the activ-
ity at issue and its interpretation of the FSIA conflicts directly
and irrevocably with the language under scrutiny. The Fifth
Circuit ineffectively interpreted the explicit provisions of the
FSIA applicable to this fact situation by misreading the legisla-
tive intent behind the FSIA. In concluding that Banco Central's
issuance of a check in these circumstances was a sovereign act
meriting immunity, the Fifth Circuit disregarded the essential
statutory requirement that the uniquely "public" or "sovereign"
nature of the act or acts in controversy be unambiguously
104. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 1387.
106. Id. Although President Somoza personally intervened on de Sanchez'
behalf to make good on the obligation, this resulted in the sale by the Central
Bank of Nicaragua of dollars to Banco Central. Id. By the time the check from
Citizens and Southern International Bank in New Orleans reached plaintiff,
her account had been frozen by a group claiming to represent the newly in-
stalled Sandinista regime. Id. at 1387-88.
107. Id. at 1393. The court defined the relevant activities of the defendant
as: 1) the issuance of and subsequent failure to honor a check; and 2) the sale of
foreign exchange reserve. Id. The court asserted that the "sovereign nature" of
the first action informed the defendant's (otherwise clearly commercial) second
action. Id. at 1394. Accord Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F. 2d 1101, 1110 (5th
Cir. 1985).
108. DeSanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393.
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proven without regard to the purposes that motivated the perti-
nent conduct. 10 9
b. The United States Supreme Court's Approach in Republic
of Argentina
When the Court addressed the FSIA and its commercial ac-
tivity exception in Republic of Argentina,110 it reasoned that
"when a foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a market,
but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sov-
ereign's actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the
FSIA." 1 The Court noted that Congress intended to codify the
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity" 2 as it had been
originally used by the State Department in 1952 in formulating
its restrictive foreign sovereign immunity policy.113 Extrapolat-
ing from this history, the Court cast the definition of commercial
activity in terms of private versus public acts." 4 Based on that
distinction, the Court modified the private person test, declaring
that "the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign
state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type
of actions by which a private party engages in trade and traffic
or commerce."" 5 Applying this test, the Court concluded that
Argentina's issuance of Bonods was a commercial activity, since
the Bonods were nothing more than garden-variety debt instru-
ments 16 that private parties routinely utilized in pursuit of
planned financial objectives. 117
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982).
110. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). See also Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976) (noting that the use of the
private person test is a means to remain within the bounds of "restrictive" im-
munity while maintaining a meaningful dichotomy between jure imperii and
jure gestionis).
111. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607.
112. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605-06.
113. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607. The State Department first advanced
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity (denying immunity for private or
commercial acts of a foreign state) by declaring in the "Tate Letter" in 1952 that
the United States had adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
thereby discarding the absolute theory of sovereign immunity previously ap-
plied. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, supra note 27.
114. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607.
115. Id. See Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877
F.2d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1989).
116. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607.
117. Id.
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Furthermore, in order to avoid any future misinterpretation
of the Republic of Argentina decision, the Court held that the
FSIA squarely and unambiguously precludes court considera-
tion of either the context or surrounding purposes of any ostensi-
bly commercial activity,118 thereby over-ruling De Sanchez,119
its ancestors and progeny. Despite the need to further clarify
the commercial activity exception in the FSIA, the Court simply
adopted the essential components of Texas Trading & Milling120
and Shapirol21 into its Republic of Argentina reasoning, rather
then addressing the issue afresh. 122 Arguably, the Court was
under an obligation to define commercial activity more clearly
than had Congress or the Second Circuit. Disappointingly,
however, the Court's opinion has left unanswered the question
of exactly what constitutes commercial activity.
The Court's reticence has led to criticism that it simply fol-
lowed the lead of other courts by incorporating into the sover-
eign immunity analysis the question of whether the foreign
state has received an economic benefit.123 This criticism is jus-
tified only if in the Court's view, the absence of economic benefit
disqualifies an activity as commercial. If the Court uses the
presence of an economic benefit as a condition precedent to rul-
ing that conduct constitutes commercial activity under the
FSIA, the Court is unduly restrictive. Although obtaining eco-
nomic benefits is often the objective of commercial (and thus pri-
vate) activity,' 24 pursuit of profit is not always a motive. For
example, a private party may engage in an activity such as
purchasing art for purely aesthetic reasons. Thus, the absence
of a profit motive does not deprive a transaction from being com-
118. Id. The Court indicated that any reference to a purpose test must be
abandoned when it commented that there was "nothing distinctive about the
state's assumption of debt (other than perhaps its purpose) that would cause it
always to be classified as jure imperri [sovereign]." Id. This language is remi-
niscent of the Second Circuit's language in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. that
the purpose behind Argentina's participation in the bond market was irrele-
vant. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300,
310 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
119. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985).
120. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 302.
121. Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991).
122. See generally Thomas, supra note 22, at 480-86 (suggesting a method-
ology by which to determine the injury-causing activity and thereafter applying
the FSIA commercial activity exception to that activity).
123. Michael Singer, Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Anal-
ysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 26 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 19 (1985).
124. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985).
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mercial if done by a sovereign state. On the contrary, it is the
fact that a private party can conduct such activity that denotes
it a commercial activity encompassed by the FSIA. Therefore, it
is quite irrelevant whether the particular activity is for profit or
whether the activity results in an economic benefit to the sover-
eign state.
Furthermore, one commentator's criticism that "[b]ecause
sovereignty itself represents a concept encompassing a wide va-
riety of potentially conflicting rights and obligations, judicial
consistency and legal predictability will not result from immu-
nity decisions based upon the maxim that the sovereignty of one
state extends no further than the sovereignty of another,"125
tends to ignore the practical realities. The more important ques-
tion is whether it is rational to conceive of sovereignty as vary-
ing from state to state as a general principle. In the interests of
intellectual consistency, the answer should be negative and the
Republic of Argentina decision will probably not be interpreted
as empowering American courts to apply different standards of
sovereignty to different states. Yet, as Justice Holmes admon-
ished in a different context, "[tihe life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience." 126 This exhortation expresses its
own inherent logic because fundamental policy considerations of
American assistance in the economic development of developing
countries may undergird granting sovereign immunity to devel-
oping countries, even in some instances where commercial as-
pects play a significant role in the particular transaction.127
Shorn of pretense, one may wonder whether Republic of Ar-
gentina presented the Court with an invaluable opportunity to
judicially codify American law on sovereign immunity and the
commercial activity exception. If so, the Court apparently de-
clined the opportunity to question either the principle itself,
which is understandable in light of the separation of powers doc-
trine and because such questioning may fall within the bailiwick
of the legislature, or the wisdom of the FSIA's commercial activ-
125. Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception,
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 498-99 (1992).
126. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1938).
127. In Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bol., 811 F.2d 1543, 1543
(D.C. Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied Bo-
livia sovereign immunity. Id. The Court of Appeals arguably misinterpreted
the private person test and failed to elevate policy considerations arising from
fundamental rural economic objectives of a developing country to levels of legal
potency sufficient to trigger sovereign immunity. Id.
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ity exception in its present form. Instead, the Court sought to
settle the conflict between the circuit courts by adopting the an-
alytical paradigm enunciated in Texas Trading and Shapiro and
essentially left it at that.
2. Direct Effect
After deciding that the injury-causing activity of the sover-
eign state is "commercial," a court must next decide whether or
not that commercial activity has caused a "direct effect" in the
United States. 128 Unfortunately, Congress only provided exam-
ples of activities that would have a "direct effect," including: (a)
commercial activity in the United States; (b) acts performed in
the United States in connection with commercial activity of a
sovereign state elsewhere; and (c) acts outside the territory of
the United States in connection with the commercial activity of
a sovereign state, which has had a demonstrable direct effect in
the United States. 129
Legislative history states that under the latter situation,
the FSIA "would embrace commercial conduct abroad having di-
rect effects within the United States which would subject such
conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States con-
sistent with principles set forth in Section 18, Restatement of
the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965)."130 This praying in aid of existing law in the FSIA's
legislative history, however, does not irrefutably clarify the de-
gree of domestic effect required, leaving the determination to a
case-by-case approach.
a. The Different Approaches of the Circuit Courts
In the absence of clear guidance, a number of circuit courts
interpreted the FSIA's legislative history as indicating that ac-
tionable commercial activity must cause a substantial and fore-
seeable effect within the United States in order to satisfy the
direct effect requirement.13 1 For example, the Sixth Circuit
128. The commercial activity must cause a direct effect in the United States
in order to become justiciable. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
129. Id.
130. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. at 6618. Accord Card, supra note 55, at 108-11 (advocating the
use of the Restatement Second formulation to define "direct effect").
131. See Abrams, supra note 30; Nicolas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Jurisdic-
tion Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Ending the Chaos in
the Circuit Courts, 28 Hous. L. REV. 629 (1991). Compare Tifa, Ltd. v. Republic
of Ghana, No. 88-1513, 1991 WL 179098 at *6-7 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1991) (holding
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Court of Appeals decided that in order to justify direct effect ju-
risdiction, "the injurious and significant financial consequences
to that corporation . . . [must be] the foreseeable, rather than
fortuitous, result of the conduct."13 2 The Ninth Circuit also
adopted substantiality and foreseeability tests as appropriate
and concluded "that Congress intended this clause to reach only
conduct causing an effect that is 'substantial' and 'direct and
foreseeable.' "133 Similarly, utilizing a similar analysis, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia defined substantial
and foreseeable effect as "something legally significant actually
... [happening] in the United States; a bank refused to pay on a
letter of credit, money was transferred, a debt was incurred." 13 4
Therefore, in the opinion of the majority of the circuit courts, in
order to have a direct effect, the commercial activity must be le-
gally significant, with both substantial and foreseeable domestic
consequences.
Arguably, in Texas Trading, the Second Circuit's interpreta-
tion of direct effect deviated from this majority view.' 35 The
Second Circuit noted that the paradigm use of direct effect oc-
financial loss to a U.S. corporation overseas was not a direct effect); Obenchain
Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inversiones, 656 F. Supp. 435, 440 (W.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1990) (financial loss
to a U.S. corporation in the United States was a direct effect by virtue of having
followed directly from the injury causing event; citing with approval the analy-
sis of Texas Trading & Milling.)
132. Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir.
1988) (involving a former employee who appropriated trade secrets and then
sold them to a joint venture between French and Japanese corporations).
133. America West Airlines v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir.
1989). Accord, Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales v. Republic of the Phil., 965 F.2d
1375, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the district court properly had juris-
diction over Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
because the act of contracting with a U.S. corporation for sale of aircraft, over
which PCGG had obtained control but to which it did not have title, had sub-
stantial, direct and foreseeable effects in the United States).
134. Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (positing that financial loss is insufficient to constitute a direct effect
without the occurrence of a 'legally significant event,' a view which further re-
fined the Restatement definition of direct effect ultimately abandoned by the
Supreme Court). See also Transamerican S.S. v. Somali Democratic Republic,
767 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
135. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d
300, 311 n. 32 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). The Second
Circuit's analysis not only adopts the financial loss approach to direct effect,
which is more faithful to the legislative purposes of the Act, but performed
groundwork for the Supreme Court's Republic of Argentina disposition by sub-
stituting the Restatement test with one that asked whether the Constitutional
minima were satisfied to establish subject matter and in personam jurisdiction.
Id. at 313-15.
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curred in tort cases, where an injury was the direct effect of
someone's negligence. However, as the court noted, "unlike a
natural person, a corporate entity is intangible; it cannot be
burned or crushed ... it can only suffer financial loss. Accord-
ingly, the relevant inquiry under the direct effect clause when
plaintiff is a corporation is whether the corporation has suffered
a direct financial loss."136 The Second Circuit has continued to
invoke this reasoning, concluding that there was no direct effect
in International Housing, Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq.137
136. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
137. 893 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989). Justice Kaufman's dissent held that pay-
ments in New York were a direct effect even though New York was not set as
the situs of payment by the contract. "In my view, the payments of over
$221,000... into Rafidain's New York account at Irving Trust at the direction of
Rafidain constitute a 'direct effect in the United States.'" Id. at 12-13 (Kauf-
man, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Accord General Electric Capital Corp.
v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993) (events occurring in United States
in the process of an acquisition of a U.S. corporation not held to be a direct effect
although Canadian acquirer suffered financial loss); Stena Rederi AB v. Comis-
ion de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del Sindicato Revolucionario de
Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, 923 F.2d 380, 390-91 (5th
Cir. 1991) (five million dollar financial loss by Swedish corporation as a result of
the seizure of its vessel in the United States did not constitute a direct effect
since plaintiff was not a U.S. entity; financial loss alone is not an adequate
measure of the effect of a foreign entity's commercial activities in the United
States, and the Mexican company's commercial activity did not cause effects in
the United States which were substantial, direct and foreseeable); Mitchell v.
Secretariat of Land Reclamation and Agr. Reform of Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 887 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1989) (no direct effect where breach of
contract by Libyan government in Libya led to default of U.S. company on its
obligations and ultimately to that firm's bankruptcy); America West Airlines v.
GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1989) (faulty engine maintenance
performed abroad by subsidiary of foreign state's national airline did not have
direct effect despite losses to domestic owner of aircraft since use of engine in
United States was not foreseeable); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527
(9th Cir. 1989) (construing Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511,
1515 (D.C. Cir. 1988) that mere financial loss cannot constitute direct effect);
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Derderian, 872 F.2d 281, 286 (9th Cir. 1989) (no
direct effect where Mexican state-owned bank accepted a deposit from the
United States which depositor had acquired by conversion in the United
States); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (Libya knew that its instrumentality intended to import oil into the
United States in violation of a boycott even if the events which occurred abroad
did not reach the level of direct effect); United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft
Oil Prod. Assoc., 821 F. Supp. 1405, 1409 (D. Colo. 1993) (mere financial loss
suffered by United States plaintiff as a result of breach of preliminary agree-
ment by foreign corporation for sale of crude oil was not direct effect); Maizus v.
Weldor Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101, 104-105 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding an in-
jury consisting of loss of money from a trust account at a U.S. bank did not
constitute a direct effect, because the purported loss would not have any imme-
diate consequence for any of the defendants who were only provisionally liable
to the U.S. plaintiff as guarantors of a promissory note); Marathon Intl Petro-
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b. The United States Supreme Court's Approach in Republic
of Argentina
In Republic of Argentina, the Court resolved the dispute be-
tween the circuits regarding direct effect by holding that the
FSIA does not "contain[ ] any... requirement of 'substantial[ I'
[effect] or 'foreseeability.'"138 The Court also acknowledged
that "jurisdiction may not be predicated upon purely trivial ef-
fects in the United States."139 In the Court's opinion, "an effect
is 'direct' if it follows as an [inevitable and] immediate conse-
quence of the defendant's ... activity." 140 In order to appropri-
ately apply this direct effect analysis to Argentina, the Court,
sua sponte,14 ' designated the United States as the place of per-
leum Supply Co. v. I.T.I. Shipping, SA., 740 F. Supp. 984, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(District Court lacked jurisdiction over action by U.S. plaintiff against foreign
shipper where financial loss in United States did not constitute direct effect).
But see Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998,
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (foreign agency's detention of ship at its port and demand
for payment in United States constituted direct effect where, at agency's insis-
tence, U.S. corporation transferred $28,000 to agency's Washington bank, and
the owner of vessel suffered approximately $10,000 per day in damages); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810
F. Supp. 1375, 1387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1644-45 (1994)
(foreign government and entity which took control of and liquidated bank's as-
sets caused direct effect in the United States when they refused to pay a note
executed and payable therein); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales Bolivanos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), reargurnent de-
nied, No. 84-C4364, 1989 WL 67239 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1989) (breach of contract
by corporate instrumentality of Bolivia which used U.S. banking system to fa-
cilitate payments to a U.S. corporation in New York caused direct effect in the
United States); L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venez., 700 F.
Supp. 114, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (intervention of foreign state had a direct
effect by causing a foreign bank to repudiate a debt which could have been paid
in the United States).
138. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing with approval the Court of Appeals in Weltover, Inc. v. Re-
public of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
See, e.g,. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 947 F.2d 218, 221 (6th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Pechiney & Trefimetoux v. Gould, 112 S.Ct. 1657 (1992)
(holding "based upon" requirement in commercial activity exception of FSIA
should be read to mean a cause of action arising from the commercial activity).
141. The Court noted that:
Although we are happy to endorse the Second Circuit's recognition of 'New
York's status as a world financial leader,' the effect of Argentina's rescheduling
in diminishing that status (assuming that it is not too speculative to be consid-
ered an effect at all) is too remote and attenuated to satisfy the 'direct effect'
requirement of the FSIA.
We nonetheless have little difficulty concluding that Argentina's unilateral
rescheduling of the maturity dates on the Bonods had a 'direct effect' in the
United States. Respondents had designated their accounts in New York as the
place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those ac-
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formance for Argentina's ultimate contractual obligations.142
The Court then concluded that Argentina's unilateral reschedul-
ing of the Bonods' maturity dates had caused a direct effect in
the United States. 143
3. Minimum Contacts
Congress unmistakably intended to limit jurisdiction under
the FSIA to situations where a foreign state had sufficient mini-
mum contacts 44 with the United States 145 to satisfy due pro-
cess. 146 The FSIA's legislative history shows that "the
requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate
notice are embodied in the provision."147 Actually, minimum
counts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments. Because New
York was thus the place of performance for Argentina's ultimate contractual ob-
ligations, the rescheduling of those obligations necessarily had a 'direct effect'
in the United States: Money that was supposed to have been delivered to a
New York bank for deposit was not forthcoming.
Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 618-19 (emphasis added).
142. Id. But c.f Chuidian v. Philippine Natl Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 562-63
(9th Cir. 1992) (letter of credit obligations occur at place of payment only if
payor bank is a confirming and not merely advising bank under the Uniform
Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits).
143. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607.
144. To constitute constitutionally minimum contacts, the defendant's
contacts with the applicable forum must satisfy three criteria. First,
the contacts must be related to the plaintiff's cause of action or have
given rise to it .... Second, the contacts must involve 'some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum..., thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws . . . .' Third, the defendant's contacts with the
forum must be 'such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.'
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault S.A. v. Vermeulen, 113 S.Ct. 2334
(1993).
145. The relevant forum for purposes of due process analysis with respect to
claims brought under the FSIA is the United States, not the particular forum
state. See also, Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 607.
146. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6612.
147. Id. See also, Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion
de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980) (personal jurisdiction under
FSIA requires satisfaction of traditional minimum contacts standard); Mari-
time Ventures Intl v. Caribbean Trading & Fidelity, Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 1340,
1350 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 722 F. Supp. 1032, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (any exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign sovereign under an exception to the FSIA must satisfy
constitutional standards of minimum contacts and due process); Ruiz v. Trans-
portes Aereos Militares Ecuadorianos, 103 F.R.D. 458, 459 (D.D.C. 1984) (the
fact that the FSIA is the exclusive means of gaining personal jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign does not abrogate the need to find sufficient contacts between
defendant and forum to satisfy constitutional due process); Decor by Nikkei
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contacts analysis may very well be the area of most widespread
agreement with respect to the commercial activity exception.
a. The Approach of the Circuit Courts
Courts must determine whether the commercial activities of
a foreign state pass muster with regard to the minimum con-
tacts criteria as well as analyze the facts and law to decide
whether the direct effect requirements are met under the
FSIA.148 In considering minimum contacts, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has interpreted the legislative his-
tory of the FSIA to mean that a foreign state is a person under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 149 In reaching
its conclusion, the Second Circuit reasoned that
A court must examine the extent to which defendants availed them-
selves of the privileges of American law, the extent to which litigation
in the United States would be foreseeable to them, the inconvenience
to defendants of litigating in the United States, and the countervailing
interest of the United States in hearing the suit.150
Generally, other circuit courts have adhered to this approach,
applying a due process minimum contacts test. 5 1
Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd
sub nom. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d
300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (in determining whether
suit may be maintained against foreign sovereign under exception to FSIA,
court must undertake a minimum contacts analysis). But see, Canadian Over-
seas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero Del Paciico, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984) (waiver of immunity by for-
eign sovereign may include waiver of defect in subject matter jurisdiction of
court).
148. E.g. coextensively and interdependently. See supra note 55 and accom-
panying text.
149. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 313.
150. Id. at 314. Accord Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of
Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893 (1980). In determining whether sufficient minimum con-
tacts are present between defendant foreign sovereign and the United States to
satisfy commercial activity exception, the court must consider whether suffi-
cient contacts exist with respect to the issue in dispute and whether mainte-
nance of the suit offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." Id. at 905. Contacts between defendant and forum must indicate that
it is reasonable to require defendant to litigate there. Id. Factors include: a)
the burden placed on defendant in litigating in the forum; b) the interest of
forum in adjudicating the dispute; and c) plaintiff's interest in obtaining conve-
nient and effective relief. Id.
151. Despite general agreement in the circuit courts about the need to apply
the due process minimum contacts test, results have diverged. See, e.g.,
Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1989) (District Court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Canadian corporation's claims against state-
owned Finnish corporations for acts not occurring in or directed toward United
States); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that in
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determining minimum contacts under the commercial activity exception, the
court would only have to consider contact of particular Soviet trading organiza-
tion named as defendant, rather than contact of any Soviet trading organiza-
tion or of entire Soviet government with the United States); Gemini Shipping,
Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. and Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317, 319-20 (2d
Cir. 1981) (in an action brought to recover for breach of guaranty of demurrage,
defendant company which solicited bids in the United States for food, being
purchased under a U.S. government financing program paid for by letter of
credit confirmed by a New York bank, had sufficient connection to permit juris-
diction under due process standard); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Pe-
troliferos Fiscales Bolivanos, 712 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (District Court
did not have specific personal jurisdiction over corporate instrumentality of gov-
ernment of Bolivia which breached contract with U.S. corporation because min-
imum contacts were not satisfied: invitation for bids never published in United
States; no employee of corporate instrumentality ever traveled to United
States in connection with transaction; no evidence of direct communications
with the United States concerning transaction; and the few employees of the
corporate instrumentality which were permanently present in the United
States were not involved in the transaction), reargument denied, No. 84-C4364,
1989 WL 67239 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1989); Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nig., 681 F. Supp. 371, 385-86 (N.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1989) (Nigerian corporation's commercial activities in the United States
had sufficient nexus with American corporation's claim, for breach of contrac-
tual duty to provide interim financing for development and implementation of
rice farm project in Nigeria, to subject Nigerian corporation to jurisdiction
under commercial activity exception); Falcoal v. Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri
Kurumu, 660 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (Turkish governmental en-
tity's agreement to pay through letter of credit in New York under a contract for
purchase of coal from a Texas corporation did not establish minimum contacts
with Texas); Chisholn & Co. v. Bank of Jam., 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (S.D.
Fla. 1986) (court's exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfied due process mini-
mum contact standards where Jamaican government bank and its former gov-
ernor had availed themselves of privileges of American law by participating in
export-import bank program and had the opportunity to obtain lines of credit
from American banks; the bank and its governor should have foreseen potential
of litigation in the United States); Crimson Semiconductor v. Electronum, 629
F. Supp. 903, 907-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (seller of electronic components had suffi-
cient contact with United States to justify jurisdiction under exception to FSIA
where seller: did business with buyer and others in United States; delivered
products to the United States; sought a market for its goods in the United
States; had its representatives visit New York several times to negotiate dis-
tributorships; received and made payments through New York banks; adver-
tised in national trade publications; and instituted attachment proceedings
against buyer during pendency of suit); Unidyne Corp. v. Aerolineas Argenti-
nas, 640 F. Supp. 354, 360 (E.D. Va. 1985) (Argentine airline lacked minimum
contacts with forum state because it had no officer or agent in Virginia, never
flew into Virginia, and had only engaged in conversations and negotiations
with Virginia corporation and did not purposely avail itself of benefits and pro-
tection of Virginia laws); Continental Graphics, Div. of Republic Corp. v. Hiller
Indus., 614 F. Supp. 1125, 1129-30 (D.C. Utah 1985) (where agency of Mexican
government had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the United
States and potential for litigation was foreseeable, requiring defendant to ap-
pear in the United States did not offend due process minimum contacts).
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Both the Second15 2 and Fifth Circuits 53 recently indicated
that the minimum contacts standard under the Due Process
Clause should apply to the determination of whether a foreign
state's activities had caused a direct effect within the United
States. The Second Circuit not only acknowledged that Con-
gress left it to the courts to "define the contours of the 'substan-
tial contacts' between a foreign state's commercial activity and
the United States," 5 4 but further concluded that "it is clear that
Congress intended a tighter nexus than the 'minimum contacts'
standard for due process."' 55 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that "[i]solated or unrelated commercial actions by a for-
eign sovereign in the United States do not authorize the
[commercial activity] exception."' 5 6
b. The United States Supreme Court's Approach in Republic
of Argentina
In Republic of Argentina, the Court concluded that Argen-
tina had satisfied the minimum contacts criteria.157 At the out-
set, however, the Court assumed "that a foreign state is a
'person' for purposes of the Due Process Clause."158 As a result
of this assumption, the Court avoided deciding whether a sover-
152. Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1991).
153. Aribba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 413 (1992).
154. Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1019.
155. Id. See also, Obenchain Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inversiones,
656 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,898 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1990) (the purposeful availment minimum contacts standard was satis-
fied for FSIA purposes when the defendant foreign sovereign, Corporacion Na-
cionale, entered Pennsylvania several times to inspect its operations there and
negotiate a contract).
156. Aribba Ltd., 962 F.2d at 533. See also Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical
Geosource, 954 F.2d 1061, 1069 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S.Ct. 193 (1992)
(court looks to place of contractual performance and purposeful activity to de-
termine whether the making of a contract with resident of forum satisfies the
purposeful availment standard for minimum contacts).
157. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 607 (1992). But see
Carlos M. Vazquez, The Relationship Between the FSIA's Commercial Activities
Exception and the Due-Process Clause, 85 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 257, 259
(1991). The author contends that Republic of Argentina is one in a series of
decisions, including Walpex Navala and Foremost McKesson, which miscon-
strue the Second Circuit's Texas Trading & Milling analysis by considering the
direct effect and due process issues separately. Id. at 258. In applying the
Texas Trading & Milling analysis, the activities of the foreign sovereign crucial
to the direct effect analysis may be exclusive of those activities analyzed to sat-
isfy the due process clause. Id. at 258-59. According to the author, this was in
fact the case in Republic of Argentina. Id. at 259.
158. Republic of Arg., 504 U.S. at 619.
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eign state is a person for purposes of minimum contacts, an is-
sue critical to rational analysis under the FSIA. In any event,
the Court unambiguously approved the application of a mini-
mum contacts analysis as the basis for determining whether an
American court has jurisdiction.
IV. IMPACT OF REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
A. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
Republic of Argentina may encourage litigation under the
FSIA by failing to improve upon and clarify the definition of
commercial activity. The Court simply declared that "when a
foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a market, but in
the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's
actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA."159 As
a result of the Court's laxity, courts may have too much latitude
in defining commercial activity. 160 Criticism of the Court's defi-
nition has continued even though the definition has not posed a
significant problem in straightforward cases decided since Re-
public of Argentina.
1. Straightforward Cases
In Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc.,161 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit lamented "this rather vague defi-
nition" 162 that "the Supreme Court expounded on,"163 in ruling
that Renault engaged in commercial activity by designing and
manufacturing the LeCar for sale in the United States. The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the state-owned French manu-
facturer Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault satisfied the crite-
ria of a foreign state acting as a market participant. The Court
of Appeals compared Renault to Ford and General Motors as ex-
amples of private parties in the automobile industry.' 64
159. Id. at 614.
160. Some Supreme Court Justices themselves have indulged this latitude.
In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. 1471, vacated, 996 F.2d 270 (11th Cir.
1993), Blackmun and White reason that running and operating a hospital, even
a public one, is a commercial enterprise. Id. at 1481, 1483. Blackmun, Ken-
nedy and Stevens categorize the conduct of hiring Nelson as an employee, with-
out appropriately warning him was potentially actionable commercial activity.
Id. at 1487, 1489.
161. 985 F. 2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Other cases fall within the straightforward category, such
as Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales v. Republic of the Philippines,1 6 5
where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
Philippine government had engaged in the market as a private
player when it sold a Falcon 50 jet to Walter Fuller Aircraft in
the United States. 166 Similarly, the Federal Court in the South-
ern District of New York 167 relied, for the most part, upon Re-
public of Argentina to deny sovereign immunity to Dubai when
Dubai assumed control of the Union Bank of the Middle East
and began to improperly liquidate the bank's assets. 168 In the
same vein, where a former secretary sued the Brazilian govern-
ment for sexual harassment, 169 the Federal Court for the South-
ern District of New York observed that the statutory definition
of commercial activity "is somewhat circular, since it defines
commercial activity in terms of commercial conduct and com-
mercial transaction." 70 Because the court reasoned that "em-
ployment of a secretary is hardly within the unique sphere of
sovereign authority, [and] ... in employing a secretary the for-
eign enters the marketplace and acts just as a private party
would," 171 it concluded that the Brazilian government was en-
gaged in commercial activity.' 72
Even more recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia 73 ruled that where former employees filed suit
against Kuwait University as an instrumentality of the Kuwait
government, the activity of operating a university satisfied the
criteria of commercial activity under the FSIA.174 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after noting critically that "we are
not the first court to acknowledge the confusing nature of the
language and structure of [the statutory definition of commer-
165. 965 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Ampac Group v. Republic of
Hond., 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992), aff'd, 40 F.3d 389 (11th Cir. 1994).
166. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, 965 F.2d at 1385-86.
167. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Committee of Receivers for A.W.
Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375, 1385-88 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and dismissed, 12 F.3d
317 (2d Cir. 1993).
168. Id.
169. Zveiter v. Brazilian Nat'l Superintendency of Merchant Marine, 833 F.
Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
170. Id. at 1092.
171. Id. at 1093.
172. Id.
173. Janini v Kuwait Univ., 43 F.3d 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
174. "[T]here is nothing 'peculiarly sovereign' about unilaterally terminat-
ing an employment contract. Private parties often repudiate contracts in every-
day commerce .... " Id. at 1537.
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cial activity]" 1 75 decided that in a suit against an agency of the
Mexican government, interference with contract rights fell
within the commercial activity exception. 176
2. Complex Cases
Where the facts of a case become more complex, the short-
comings of the Republic of Argentina's definition of commercial
activity become more apparent. Recently, the Court applied the
Republic of Argentina definition to the facts of Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson i 7 7 with mixed results. 178 In Nelson, the Court lamented
that in seeking to identify conduct which qualified as commer-
cial activity, the FSIA was "too obtuse to be of much help."'
7 9
The Court observed that to the extent that a definition was in-
cluded in the FSIA, x8 0 it was "one distinguished only by its diffi-
dence . . . [and left] the critical term commercial largely
undefined."'"i The Court acknowledged, "[wie do not, however,
have the option to throw up our hands. The term has to be given
175. Export Group v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995).
176. Id. at 1477.
177. 113 S.Ct. 1471 (1993). Justice Souter authored the majority opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas con-
curred, and in which Justice Kennedy joined except for the last paragraph of
part II. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Blackmun
joined. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which Justice Blackmun joined and Justice Stevens joined as to Parts I-
B and II. Justice Stevens dissented.
178. In applying the commercial activity test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Republic of Argentina, seven Justices concluded that in light of the
pertinent facts the injury did not arise from the carrying on of commercial activ-
ity by Saudi Arabia and therefore the requirements of the exception had not
been satisfied (viz. Rehnquist, C.J. and O'Connor, Scalia, Souter and Thomas,
JJ., all five of whom joined in the entire opinion of the Court, plus Kennedy and
Stevens, JJ., who joined in part and dissented in part); two Justices (viz. Black-
mun and White, JJ.) reasoned that commercial activity had indeed been carried
on (i.e., operation of a hospital), but in Saudi Arabia rather than in the United
States and therefore the requirements of the exception had not been met in this
regard; Justice Blackmun then joined with Justices Kennedy and Stevens in
dissenting from dismissal of the "failure to warn" claims asserted by Nelson,
supporting instead remand of these claims to the District Court for further con-
sideration. Justice Stevens alone voted to affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals based upon the failure to warn arguments. Id. The fractured splinter-
ing of the Court's opinion in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson indicates the ineffective-
ness of the Republic of Argentina decision in lucidly defining commercial
activity.
179. Id. at 1478 (citing Callejo v. Bancomer, SA., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1985)).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
181. Saudi Arabia, 113 S.Ct. at 1478 (emphasis added).
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some interpretation." 182 The Court then embarked upon a fac-
tual analysis of the case "by identifying the particular conduct
on which the.., action is based ... "183 In an opinion by Jus-
tice Souter, a majority of the Court decided that "the conduct
boils down to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Gov-
ernment, and however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may
be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has long
been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as pecu-
liarly sovereign in nature."' 84
Concurring in the judgment only, Justices White and Black-
mun disagreed with the majority on the issue of commercial ac-
tivity, reasoning that the injury-causing activity was the
enlistment by the state-owned hospital of the police, and that
this conduct was "certainly well within the bounds of commer-
cial activity."185 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, dissented, agreeing with Nelson that Saudi Arabia
engaged in commercial activity involving substantial contact
with the United States by conducting their recruitment activi-
ties in the United States. 186 These Justices categorized this con-
duct as routine commercial activity because "a negligent
omission [was allegedly] made during the recruiting of a hospi-
tal employee in the United States." 87 Justice Stevens also wrote
a separate dissenting opinion in which he agreed with Justices
White and Blackmun that Nelson's suit was based upon com-
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1477.
184. Id. at 1479. According to Justice Souter, exercise of the powers of police
and penal officers is not the sort of action by which private parties can engage
in commerce. Id. Souter noted that: "[S]uch acts as legislation, or the expulsion
of an alien, or a denial ofjustice, cannot be performed by an individual acting in
his own name. They can be performed only by the state acting as such." Id. at
1480 (citing Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 225 (1952)). Justice Kennedy concurred with
the part of the majority opinion that held the "intentional wrongdoing by the
Hospital and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are based on sovereign... activity
.... " Id. at 1484-85. But see, Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims
To Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Viola-
tions of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49 (1985) (claim-
ing that it should be universally recognized that judicial deference to sovereign
state acts depends upon the sovereign state's respect for international law).
185. Saudia Arabia, 113 S.Ct. at 1481. Justices White and Blackmun con-
curred in the judgment because, in their opinion, the commercial activity did
not have a direct effect in the United States nor was it carried on in the United
States. Id. at 1484.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1485.
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mercial activity. 188 From the fractured opinions present in Nel-
son, it is apparent that the debate over the definition of
commercial activity continues.
Subsequently, in Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran,189 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowledged be-
ing puzzled by the Nelson case' 90 and arguably proceeded to
narrow the interpretation of commercial activity as promulgated
in Republic of Argentina. 91 In Cicippio, victims of an interna-
tional kidnapping filed suit against the government of Iran as-
serting, inter alia, that Iran had allegedly hired operatives to
perpetrate a kidnapping and conditioned the release of the vic-
tims on the return of assets frozen by the United States.1 92 The
court held that "we take from [Republic of Argentina] the key
proposition that in determining whether a given government ac-
tivity is commercial under the act, we must ask whether the ac-
tivity is one in which commercial actors typically engage."193
Because kidnapping is hardly activity in which commercial ac-
tors typically engage, the court ruled that the kidnapping did
not fall within the commercial activity exception and thus Iran
could assert sovereign immunity.194
Therefore, under the Cicippio test, 95 acts that are atypical
of commercial actors' 96 would fall outside the commercial activ-
ity exception, even though private parties could engage in them.
This approach unmistakably conflicts with Republic of Argen-
tina's broader interpretation, which includes both typical and
atypical acts of private parties, because private parties are capa-
188. Id. at 1487-89. Stevens therefore disagreed with the majority as well
as Justices White and Blackmun and agreed with Justice Kennedy's analysis of
that aspect of the case. Id. at 1489. See Thomas, supra note 22 (suggesting that
the methodology for the determination of whether an activity is commercial
should be based exclusively on the injury-causing activity).
189. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
190. Id. at 167.
191. Id. at 168.
192. Id. at 165.
193. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
194. Cicippio, 30 F.3d at 168.
195. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
196. In Cicippio, in the opinion of the Court, "[plerhaps a kidnapping of a
commercial rival could be thought to be a commercial activity. If so, it would
... be... because the kidnapping took place in a commercial context." Cicippio,
30 F.3d at 168. However, under the test proposed by the Court itself in Cicip-
pio, because such an act would not be typical for commercial actors it would not
satisfy the requirements of the commercial activity exception under the FSIA;
whereas, under the Republic of Argentina test, such acts, even though atypical,
could nevertheless pass muster as commercial activity under the FSIA.
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ble of engaging in both.197 Perhaps, in Cicippio, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was noting its disapproval
of its earlier decision in Practical Concepts v. Republic of Bo-
livia, a somewhat atypical transaction which probably should
have been immunized under sovereign immunity principles.198
B. DIRECT EFFECT
The Court's decision in Republic of Argentina has had a sim-
ilarly profound impact upon the determination of direct effect.
The Court adopted the Second Circuit's interpretation of direct
effect, rejecting a substantial and foreseeable requirement. 199
In endorsing the Second Circuit's broad definition of direct ef-
fect, the Court prompts American courts to err on the side of
finding a direct effect.
Subsequent to Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit has
had second thoughts about jettisoning the substantial and fore-
seeable components of the direct effect test. In Antares Aircraft
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN),200 Antares Aircraft owned
an aircraft registered in Nigeria.20 1 Nigeria's Airports Author-
ity (NAA) detained the plane in Nigeria, allegedly because Anta-
res failed to pay certain airport landing and parking fees.202
After negotiating with NAA, Antares transferred approximately
$100,000 from a New York bank to Nigeria.203 Five months
later NAA released the aircraft, but by then it had sustained
physical damage from exposure to the elements. 204 Alleging
conversion of its aircraft, Antares filed suit against FRN and
NAA in the Southern District of New York for damages. 20 5 The
District Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction and Antares appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 20 6 The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed
the District Court's decision, reasoning that the legally signifi-
cant event, the conversion of the aircraft, occurred in Nigeria,
197. "[T]he issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state per-
forms.., are the type of actions by which a private party engages in trade or
commerce...." Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
198. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. 948 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 112 S.Ct. 3020
(1992).




205. Antares Aircraft, 948 F.2d at 90.
206. Id.
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and thus it denied jurisdiction under the FSIA.207 The Supreme
Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded for a
decision consistent with the definition of direct effect adopted in
Republic of Argentina.208
On remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its prior deci-
sion.20 9 In the opinion of the Second Circuit, the Court had en-
dorsed its view of direct effect.210 The Second Circuit conceded
that the Court had not expressly adopted its "legally significant
acts" test,211 but the Court had used a similar analysis.212
Thus, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the use of its own "legally
significant act(s) test."213 The Second Circuit noted that "the
sole act connected to the United States in the instant matter, the
drawing of a check on a bank in New York, was entirely fortui-
tous and entirely unrelated to the liability of [FRA and
NAA]." 2 14 Furthermore, the Second Circuit was not persuaded
by Antares' argument that the Republic of Argentina's direct ef-
fect test was satisfied because Antares had suffered a financial
loss as a result of the conduct of FRN and NAA.215 The Court
reasoned that:
[T]he fact that an American individual or firm suffers some financial
loss from a foreign tort cannot, standing alone, suffice to trigger the
exception .... If a loss to an American individual and firm resulting
from a foreign tort were sufficient standing alone to satisfy the direct
effect requirement, the commercial activity exception would in large




209. Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nig., 999 F.2d 33 (2nd Cir.
1993).
210. "In Weltover, the [Supreme] Court endorsed our view that an effect is
direct if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity." Id.
at 35.
211. Id. at 36.
212. Id.
213. The court applied the test as follows:
[fIn the instant matter, all legally significant acts took place in Nigeria.
The aircraft was registered in Nigeria. There is no evidence that the
use of the aircraft was related to substantial commerce with the
United States. The detention of, and physical damage to, the plane
happened in Nigeria. The alleged conversion thus occurred in Nigeria.
Moreover, the negotiations over, and payment of, the outstanding fees
occurred in Nigeria and utilized Nigerian currency.... The tort thus
began in Nigeria with the detention of the aircraft and ended in Nige-
ria with the payment of the money ... [u]nlke Weltover, where the
parties had agreed that performance was to occur in New York ....
Id. (emphasis added).
214. Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citations omitted).
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The Court thus rejected the notion that a direct effect alone
is sufficient, a result consistent with other circuits that had
adopted a substantiality and foreseeability requirement. In An-
tares, the Second Circuit took a small step towards abandoning
their earlier position. The Second Circuit may have decided An-
tares incorrectly, however, and the decision may not reflect a full
understanding of its own test 217 which the Court later endorsed
in Republic of Argentina. The Court undoubtedly intended the
direct effect test to impact individuals differently from artificial
persons such as corporations and limited partnerships. 218 The
Court did not necessarily intend that a loss to an American indi-
vidual standing alone would satisfy the direct effect test. The
Court did, however, intend that a loss to a corporation standing
alone could and should satisfy the direct effect test in appropri-
ate circumstances. 2 19
Furthermore, on remand of Antares, the dissent concluded
that a direct effect was proven because the Court had vacated
the Second Circuit's earlier decision and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Republic of Argentina.220 This
was the case, the dissent argued, because "limited partnerships
are not natural persons, and consequently can only suffer finan-
cial rather than physical injuries ... [and] these financial inju-
ries are directly felt where a firm was organized or where its
principal place of business is located."22 ' Thus, the dissent rea-
soned that Republic of Argentina necessitated a finding of direct
effect on the facts of the case.
In contrast to the arguably incorrect decision in the remand
of Antares222 is the decision of the Southern District Court of
Florida in AMPAC Group v. Republic of Honduras.223 In
AMPAC, the court correctly applied the Republic of Argentina
test. The court held that a direct effect existed where AMPAC,
a United States corporation, suffered a direct financial loss when
217. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
218. See Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 37 n.1.
219. "Unlike a natural person, a corporate entity is intangible; it cannot be
burned or crushed. It can only suffer financial loss. Accordingly, the relevant
inquiry under the direct effect clause when the plaintiff is a corporation is
whether the corporation has suffered a direct financial loss." See Texas Trading
& Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
220. Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 37.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 33.
223. AMPAC Group v. Republic of Hond., 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(action for breach of contract arising out of Honduras' privatization program).
1996]
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
the Republic of Honduras breached its contract with AMPAC. 224
As the Court had indicated in Republic of Argentina, the court in
AMPAC acknowledged that the only meaningful injury is when
a corporation suffers financial loss. 2 25 Therefore, the court held
that because financial losses necessarily occur in the place of in-
corporation, a direct effect occurred within the United States. 226
The AMPAC decision was an inevitable consequence of the
Court's direct effect test articulated in Republic of Argentina.227
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit encountered sim-
ilar difficulties in applying the Republic of Argentina direct ef-
fect test in United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil.228 In
United World Trade (UWT), the Kazakhstan Commerce Foreign
Economic Association (Kazcom) acted as an agent for
Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Association (MOP) and con-
tracted with UWT, whereby MOP agreed to sell oil to UWT.229
Payment was to be in United States dollars through a European/
USA Bank.230 The oil was transported from Kazakhstan to Sic-
ily and payment was made through a bank in Paris. 231 The first
two shipments took place uneventfully, but because difficulties
occurred with the third shipment, MOP and Kazcom refused to
supply any more oil to UWT. 232 When UWT sued Kazcom and
MOP in federal court, the district court ruled that the defend-
ants were entitled to sovereign immunity and dismissed the
suit.
2 3 3
In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit observed
that it struggled to identify objective standards that would aid
in determining what qualifies as a direct effect in the United
States.234 The Tenth Circuit noted that the phrase "direct ef-
fect" seems "hopelessly ambiguous when applied to any particu-
lar transaction."235 The court appeared to mourn the loss of "the
guideposts previously adopted by many courts, the requirement
224. Id. at 977.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
228. 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 904 (1995). "We
recognize the amorphous nature of the issue before us." Id. at 1239.
229. Id. at 1235.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1236.
233. United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1234.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1237 (emphasis added).
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that a direct effect be both substantial and foreseeable."236 It
acknowledged that "[als a result, we are left to determine what
qualifies as a direct effect largely from the Court's example in
applying the statute to the facts before it in [Republic of Argen-
tina]."237 Nevertheless, the court decided that because "[tihe
performance of this contract was to take place entirely in Eu-
rope,"2 3 8 any effects in the United States were insufficient to
meet the direct effect requirements of the FSIA.2 39 In the Tenth
Circuit's opinion, although UWT, a Colorado corporation, lost
profits within the United States as a result of MOP's and
Kazcom's conduct, this did not suffice to meet the "direct effect in
the United States" test.240
In conclusion, despite subsequent attempts by the lower
courts to properly apply the Court's Republic of Argentina direct
effect analysis, uncertainty remains regarding when the direct
effect test is satisfied. The Court should have retained a sub-
stantiality and foreseeability requirement because it provides
more concrete guidance to courts than the de minimus test the
Court embraced in Republic of Argentina.
C. MINIMUM CONTACTS
Analysis of minimum contacts has not proven particularly
controversial because the Court in Republic of Argentina "as-
sum[ed] ... that a foreign state is a person for purposes of the
Due Process Clause ... "241 The circuit courts have developed
236. Id.
237. Id. See, e.g., Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238
(2nd Cir. 1994). "The failure of the Iraqi Banks to remit funds in New York, as
they were contractually bound to do, had a direct effect in the United States
under Weltover." Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
238. United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1238 (emphasis added). "The process
by which UWT obtained an exchange of currency in the United States is simply
too attenuated from the defendant's actions to be considered a direct effect." Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1238. Presumably because it was de minimis.
When all of the facts are examined together in this case, including the
legally significant acts, we are compelled to find that the direct effect of
the defendants' alleged acts occurred in Europe rather than in the
United States. The fact that UWT, had it received additional funds in
London pursuant to the contract, would have then transferred those
funds to the United States does not allow us to conclude that the loss
suffered by appellant was sufficiently in the United States to warrant
jurisdiction under [the FSIA].
Id. at 1239 (emphasis added).
241. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). "By issuing
negotiable debt instruments denominated in U.S. dollars and payable in New
York and by appointing a financial agent in that city, Argentina purposefully
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their own standards by limiting the application of the due pro-
cess minimum contacts analysis to those injury-causing com-
mercial activities that yield a direct effect in the United States.
For example, in Vermeulen the Eleventh Circuit accepted that
the Court has not definitively decided "whether [the FSIAI incor-
porates the minimum contacts test."242 Thus, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit effectively limited the minimum contacts analysis to those
commercial activities which satisfied the direct effect require-
ments.243  Similarly, the Second Circuit elected to apply the
minimum contacts test only to the commercial activities causing
the direct effect in Seetransport Wiking Trader Shiffarht-
sgesellshchaft MBH v. Navimpex Centrala Navala.244
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Republic of Argentina is disap-
pointing. In construing the commercial activity exception under
the FSIA, the Court held that a sovereign state may only assert
sovereign immunity when it acts as a market regulator, not as a
market participant. However, these concepts are not necessar-
ily self evident and clear guidance would be helpful in applying
them to complex factual situations. By failing to define commer-
cial activity more clearly, the Court has left the definition too
broad, so that nearly any activity of a business nature that a
private party may engage in, whether typical or atypical, for
profit or not for profit, would fall within the definition. At the
very least, these penumbra need clarification. Although typical
private party activity based upon custom and practice should
not be immunized, atypical activity should stand on a different
footing. 245
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the United States."
Id. at 619-20.
242. Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545 (11th Cir.
1993).
243. Id.
244. 989 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993).
245. See, e.g., supra note 94, and accompanying text. See also George R.
Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, 79 Am. J. INT'L L.
319 (1985) (comparing United States and European sovereign immunity doc-
trine by examining groups of cases concerning: 1) exploitation of natural re-
sources; 2) economic promotion activities of states and their agencies; 3) joint
ventures involving governmental entities; and 4) financial transactions relat-
ing to the economic development objectives of a foreign sovereign); Henry P. de
Vries, The Enforcement of Economic Development Agreements With Foreign
States, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 1 (1984) (outlining different modes of dispute
settlement).
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The Court also made it easier to establish a direct effect
under the FSIA by discarding the substantiality and foreseeabil-
ity requirement. The Court should have retained these guide-
posts, 246  because removing them has introduced an
unwarranted degree of indeterminacy into the judicial task of
resolving sovereign disputes. Their removal has created a risk
of lowering the threshold of direct effect in the United States,
thereby effectively reducing the circumstances in which a sover-
eign state may invoke sovereign immunity.
Inevitably, the Court's less stringent standards may lead
American courts to deny sovereign immunity to developing
countries, whose governments often act as private parties en-
gaging in commercial development to encourage foreign invest-
ment.247 Furthermore, Republic of Argentina will encourage
parties to resort to American courts more frequently for resolv-
ing international commercial disputes which have a "direct ef-
fect" in the United States, as defined by American courts. 248
This is not the best solution because it may restrict the ability to
bring change to former communist countries and to developing
countries as they pursue change in their economies. Hauling
them into American courts may well chill some promising
initiatives .249
In Republic of Argentina, the Court failed to establish ap-
propriate parameters for sovereign immunity. As a result,
American courts have too much latitude to fashion their own re-
sponses to litigation under the FSIA and will continue to do so
until the Court re-examines and retrenches the commercial ac-
tivity exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
246. See United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil, 33 F.3d 1232, 1237
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 904 (1995).
247. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
248. Accord Keith Highet, et al., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 112
S.Ct. 2160, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 820 (1992) (arguing that the direct effect test will
considerably broaden the exception to sovereign immunity and subject more
foreign activities to U.S. jurisdiction).
249. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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